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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY V. REGENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DISINTEREST IN RELIANCE INTERESTS 
RACHAEL E. SAVAGE* 
 
“Anywhere we are planted we are capable of blooming.”1 
 
Abigail was born in Jamaica.2  She lived in a clapboard house without 
access to clean water, let alone opportunity.3  She was sent to the United 
States just before her twelfth birthday.4  The neighborhood she was brought 
to was not the America she had envisioned: it was dangerous and overrun 
with gangs.5  Despite the challenges of growing up in such a neighborhood, 
Abigail excelled socially and academically.6  But even with these successes, 
she faced a major obstacle: she was brought to this country without the proper 
documents.7  When she learned that she was undocumented, Abigail felt 
ashamed and feared being discovered.8  “I felt like a criminal,” she 
remembers.9   
In 2012, Abigail’s world changed.10  President Obama’s Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a memorandum entitled “Exercising 
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United 
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 1. Abigail, Anywhere We Are Planted We Are Capable of Blooming, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. 
(Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.nilc.org/2018/02/21/anywhere-planted-capable-of-blooming/.  
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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States as Children.”11  The memorandum outlined new priorities under which 
DHS should choose to exercise prosecutorial discretion and grant deferred 
action when dealing with certain individuals who were brought to this 
country as children.12  The program became known as Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, or DACA,13 and was popular with a majority of 
Americans.14  Abigail and about 800,000 similarly-situated individuals15 
qualified for an exercise of discretion under DACA.16  As part of the DACA 
program, Abigail could get her driver’s license and work legally—she had a 
future here.17  Abigail went on to earn her bachelor’s and master’s degrees.18  
She got a job working at a local nonprofit that served vulnerable 
individuals.19  She supported and positively contributed to her community.20  
Then, in 2017, President Trump’s DHS issued a memorandum ending the 
DACA program, 21 and with it, Abigail’s security.   
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California,22 the Supreme Court addressed DHS’s attempt to rescind the 
DACA immigration program.23  The Court held that DHS’s rescission of 
DACA was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of Section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).24  The Court correctly relied on 
faults in DHS’s reasoning to render the program’s rescission invalid, but the 
                                                          
 11. Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who 
Came to the United States as Children, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-
to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter DACA Memo]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Feb. 1, 
2021), https://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca.  
 14. A 2012 poll found that fifty seven percent of Americans supported the DACA program.  
New Poll: Obama’s New DREAMer Deferred Action Policy Popular, Pragmatic, AMERICA’S 
VOICE (Nov. 13, 2012), https://americasvoice.org/press_releases/new-poll-obamas-new-dreamer-
deferred-action-policy-popular-pragmatic/.  Nearly a decade later, a 2021 poll found that seventy 
two percent of Americans supported the program.  Nicole Narea, Poll: Most Americans Support a 
Path to Citizenship for Undocumented Immigrants, VOX (Feb. 4, 2021, 8:30 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2021/2/4/22264074/poll-undocumented-immigrants-
citizenship-stimulus-biden. 
 15. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 
(Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca-overview. 
 16. Abigail, supra note 1. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  
 21. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 13. 
 22. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
 23. Id. at 1901–02. 
 24. Id. at 1915. 
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Court failed to meaningfully address the many reliance interests at stake in 
the case.25   
Weighing reliance interests is an important and necessary process courts 
must undertake to determine whether agency action is arbitrary or 
capricious.26  Considering the impact of agency action on those who rely on 
prior agency policy is well-settled precedent, especially when those impacts 
are pecuniary or affect regulated industries.27  Reliance interests must be 
considered not just when industries rely to their detriment, but also when 
individuals rely to their detriment.28  This consideration is especially 
important when those individuals’ interests also implicate pecuniary 
interests.29  In neglecting to weigh the reliance interests at stake in DACA’s 
                                                          
 25. See id. at 1914 (dismissing the respondents’ concerns about DACA recipients’ reliance 
interests as “not necessarily dispositive”).  The reliance interests of DACA recipients played a major 
role in opposition to the attempted rescission.  Brief for Respondent at 6–7, 41, Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587; 18-588; 18-589) 
[hereinafter Brief for Regents].  The respondents argued that DHS should have considered DACA 
recipients’ reliance interests but did not.  Id.  Multiple briefs filed in support of the respondents also 
highlighted the importance of their reliance interests.  See, e.g., Brief for Alianza Americas et al. at 
7–8, 13, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-
587; 18-588; 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for Alianza Americas] (highlighting the “major life 
decisions” the DACA policy incentivized); Brief for Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. et al at 6–8, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-587; 18-588; 18-
589) [hereinafter Brief for Association of American Medical Colleges] (highlighting the “significant, 
long-term investments” the DACA policy incentivized); Brief for Nat’l Educ. Ass’n & Nat’l PTA 
at 5–29, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (Nos. 18-
587; 18-588; 18-589) [hereinafter Brief for National Education Association] (highlighting the 
numerous contributions DACA recipients make to the American education system and the 
consequences of rescinding the program). 
 26. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); see also infra 
notes 105–120 and accompanying text.  
 27. See infra notes 112–117 and accompanying text for examples of cases in which the 
Supreme Court found relevant the pecuniary interests of industries that relied to their detriment on 
prior agency policies. 
 28. See infra Section IV.B (explaining that reliance interests are relevant in every instance of 
judicial review of agency action under APA § 706). 
 29. See infra notes 262, 265, 269, 271, 282 and accompanying text for examples of these 
pecuniary interests.  As is discussed more fully below in Section IV.B, DACA recipients make 
substantial contributions to the United States economy.  Nicole Prchal Svajlenka & Philip E. 
Wolgin, What We Know About the Demographic and Economic Impacts of DACA Recipients: 
Spring 2020 Edition, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 6, 2020, 9:01AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2020/04/06/482676/know-
demographic-economic-impacts-daca-recipients-spring-2020-edition/.  They pay more than $8.5 
billion in federal, state, and local taxes each year.  Id.  DACA recipients also help fund Social 
Security and Medicare through their payroll tax contributions.  Id.  In addition to tax contributions, 
DACA recipients have nearly $25 billion in spending power to use in their communities.  Id.  They 
also own more than 56,000 homes across the United States and make more than $565 million in 
mortgage payments annually.  Id.  The Supreme Court should have taken these contributions into 
account when determining the legality of the DACA rescission.  See infra Section IV.B. 
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rescission, the Court, contrary to its own long-established precedent, “failed 
to consider an important aspect of the problem.”30 
I. THE CASE  
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California, the Supreme Court decided three cases31 resulting from 
challenges to the Trump Administration’s attempted rescission of the DACA 
program.32  The DACA program allows specified noncitizens who entered 
the United States as children, a group known as “Dreamers,”33 to apply for a 
two-year deferral of removal.34  In June of 2012, the Obama-era DHS enacted 
the DACA program by memorandum.35  In November of 2014, DHS issued 
a second memorandum that expanded DACA eligibility and created the 
                                                          
 30. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see 
infra Section IV.B. 
 31. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018), 
vacated in part and rev’d in part, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 
(D.D.C. 2018), aff’d sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 
1891 (2020); Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), vacated in part, aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 
(2020). 
 32. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901–02.  
 33. “Dreamers” get their name from the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors 
(“DREAM”) Act.  The Dream Act: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Mar. 16, 2021), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/dream-act-overview.  The Act would 
provide certain children who came to the country illegally with a pathway to legal status.  Id.  Since 
its first introduction to Congress in 2001, the DREAM Act or versions of it have been introduced 
more than ten times.  Id.  Despite bipartisan support for each version of the Act, no version has 
become law.  Id.  
 34. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901–02.  
 35. Id. at 1901.  The DACA memorandum concluded that noncitizens who meet certain criteria 
“warrant favorable treatment under the immigration laws” and instructs Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”) officials to use prosecutorial discretion to defer removal action for a period 
of two years.  Id. at 1901–02.  To qualify for DACA, individuals must have been under the age of 
thirty-one in 2012; have resided in the United States since 2007; be either current students, or have 
completed high school, or be honorably discharged veterans; not have been convicted of serious 
crimes; and not threaten national security.  Id. at 1901.  The DACA memorandum also directed ICE 
to consider DACA recipients for work authorization.  Id. at 1901–02.  Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 
1.3(a)(4)(vi) and 42 C.F.R. § 417.422(h), recipients of deferred action are eligible to receive Social 
Security and Medicare benefits.  Id.  More than 700,000 individuals were eligible for DACA at its 
inception.  Id.  More than 1.3 million individuals are eligible today.  Deferred Action for Childhood 
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Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(“DAPA”)36 program.37   
Before the DAPA memorandum’s implementation, Texas and twenty-
five other states sued in the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas.38  The states alleged that the DAPA memorandum breached 
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the APA’s notice-and-
comment requirement, and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.39  The 
district court found the states likely to succeed on the merits of at least one 
of their claims and entered a preliminary injunction against the DAPA 
memorandum’s implementation.40 
In 2015, a split panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit affirmed the injunction.41  It found that the states were likely to 
succeed on their APA claim and that DAPA was “manifestly contrary” to the 
carefully crafted scheme of the INA.42  The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in “an equally divided Court.”43  Litigation over the DAPA 
memorandum and its expansion of the DACA program continued in Texas, 
but the programs remained enjoined.44  
In June of 2017, DHS rescinded the DAPA memorandum.45  That 
September, Attorney General Jeff Sessions advised Acting Secretary of 
Homeland Security Elaine Duke that DHS should also rescind the DACA 
                                                          
 36. The DAPA program authorized deferred action for parents whose children legally were in 
the country, either as citizens or lawful permanent residents.  Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1902.  At the 
time, the program would have made more than 4 million individuals eligible for deferred action and 
associated benefits.  Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1901–02 (citing Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677–78 (S.D. Tex. 2015)). 
 41. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015).  In Texas, the government argued 
that the DAPA memorandum was based on prosecutorial discretion because ‘“lawful presence’ is 
not [] status,” so DHS could revoke or alter the parameters of lawful presence at any time.  Id. at 
167.  If DHS’s actions were based on prosecutorial discretion, those actions would be unreviewable 
because decisions whether to prosecute are left entirely to agency officials and courts may not 
interfere with such decisions.  Id.  The Fifth Circuit majority disagreed, reasoning that DAPA was 
reviewable because the program would confer lawful presence and benefits on a certain class of 
noncitizens and was “much more than nonenforcement.”  Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1902 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. (quoting Texas, 809 F.3d at 179–81 (internal quotation marks omitted)).  The Fifth 
Circuit also rejected the federal government’s claims that DACA was an exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion, citing the benefits DACA recipients could receive if they were granted deferrals.  Id. at 
1920 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
 43. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam).  
 44. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903. 
 45. Id.  The Trump Administration DHS cited DAPA never taking effect, the injunction and 
Texas litigation, and the Administration’s new immigration enforcement priorities as reasons for 
the rescission.  Id. 
  
118 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 80:113 
memorandum because it “shared the ‘same legal . . . defects that the courts 
recognized as to DAPA’ and was ‘likely’ to meet a similar fate.”46  Secretary 
Duke issued a decision memorandum explaining that DACA would be 
terminated and specified the process by which the program would be “wound 
down.”47 
Plaintiffs, ranging from individuals to advocacy groups, challenged 
Secretary Duke’s decision in California,48 New York,49 and District of 
Columbia federal district courts.50  Plaintiffs claimed “the rescission was 
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA and that it infringed the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”51  All 
three district courts ultimately found for the plaintiffs.52  The United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia held that Secretary Duke’s 
“conclusory statements were insufficient to explain” the DACA rescission.53  
The court stayed its order to permit DHS to reissue its memorandum 
terminating DACA so that DHS could provide a “fuller explanation” for its 
rescission.54  
                                                          
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  The “wind-down of the program” was effective immediately.  Elaine C. Duke, 
Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-
daca [hereinafter Duke Memo].  Secretary Duke’s memorandum advised that no new DACA 
applications would be accepted.  Id.  DHS could, on “an individual, case-by-case basis,” review 
applications for two-year renewals from DACA recipients whose benefits would expire within six 
months of the memorandum.  Id.  For all other recipients, previously issued deferred action 
determinations and work authorizations would not be revoked but would expire at the end of their 
validity periods with no prospect for renewal.  Id. 
 48. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 298 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (N.D. Cal. 
2018). 
 49. Vidal v. Nielsen, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). 
 50. NAACP v. Trump, 298 F. Supp. 3d 209 (D.D.C. 2018).  
 51. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903. 
 52. Id.  All three courts rejected the government’s arguments that the claims were unreviewable 
based on the APA and that the courts lacked jurisdiction under the INA.  Id. at 1903–04.  The 
Regents and Vidal courts also held that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged equal protection claims 
and proceeded to enter “coextensive nationwide preliminary injunctions.”  Id. at 1904.  Immigrants’ 
rights organization Casa de Maryland also challenged the DACA rescission.  Id. at 1903 n.2.  In a 
memorandum opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted partial 
summary judgment to the government despite lamenting its holding.  Casa de Md. v. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 284 F. Supp. 3d 758, 779 (D. Md. 2018) (“This Court does not like the outcome of 
this case.”).  After the government filed petitions for certiorari in Regents, Vidal, and NAACP, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and found 
the Secretary’s rescission arbitrary and capricious, therefore in violation of the APA.  Casa de Md. 
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 924 F.3d 684, 706 (4th Cir. 2019).  The Fourth Circuit stayed its mandate 
after the Supreme Court took up Regents, Vidal, and NAACP.  Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1903 n.2. 
 53. NAACP, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 243–45 (deferring ruling on the equal protection ground but 
granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on the APA claim). 
 54. Id. at 245.  
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Secretary Duke’s successor, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen, responded via 
memorandum two months later by ‘“declin[ing] to disturb’ the rescission.”55  
She purported to clarify Secretary Duke’s memorandum by identifying three 
reasons for rescinding DACA.56  The government petitioned the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia to revise its order based on Secretary 
Nielsen’s memorandum, but the court declined.57  The court reasoned that 
the Nielsen memorandum ‘“fail[ed] to elaborate meaningfully’ on the 
agency’s illegality rationale” and “still did not provide an adequate 
explanation” for the rescission.58  The government appealed the decision.59  
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction the district court ordered in 
Regents,60 but before the other federal circuits decided, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and consolidated all of the cases for argument.61  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND  
Agency action is subject to judicial review under the APA62 where no 
organic statute governs the action and where the action is not committed to 
agency discretion.63  The APA’s framework “sets forth the procedures by 
which federal agencies are accountable to the public and their actions subject 
                                                          
 55. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1904 (quoting Application to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No. 18-587), p. 121a). 
 56. Id.  Secretary Nielsen cited the Attorney General’s conclusion that DACA was unlawful, 
DHS’s doubts about DACA’s legality, and the Trump Administration’s new policy priorities.  Id.  
Specifically, Secretary Nielsen outlined the following Trump Administration priorities: “any class-
based immigration relief should come from Congress . . . ; DHS’s preference for exercising 
prosecutorial discretion on ‘a truly individualized, case-by-case basis’; and [] the importance of 
‘project[ing] a message’ that immigration laws would be enforced . . . .”  Id. (quoting Application 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. 
Ct. 1891 (2020) (No.18-587), pp. 123a–24a) (alteration in original). 
 57. Id. at 1904–05 (quoting NAACP, 315 F. Supp. 3d at 460, 473–74). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1905. 
 60. 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 61. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1905. 
 62. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96. 
 63. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 
340, 345 (1984); see, e.g., Drake v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding 
that judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) action under the APA was 
unavailable as the FAA’s actions were already regulated by an organic statute).  The Supreme Court 
has recognized a “strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative 
action.”  Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).  This presumption 
of judicial review is embodied in the APA.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–
96.  Where judicial review is permitted, the APA lays out courts’ scope of review, which determines 
how and by which legal standards courts may review agency action.  See, e.g., Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (outlining the standards by which courts may review agency action); 
id. § 553 (outlining the standards by which courts may review agencies’ compliance with procedural 
requirements). 
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to review by the courts.”64  The APA requires agencies’ decision-making to 
be “reasoned”65 and demands that “arbitrary” or “capricious” decisions be 
“set aside.”66  The standard of review is “narrow,” meaning courts are not to 
“substitute [their] judgment for that of the agency.”67  Instead, courts must 
determine only whether the decision was “based on a consideration of the 
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”68  
Section II.A describes the function of the APA as a check on agency power.69  
Section II.B discusses the parameters for judicial review of agency action 
under the APA.70  Section II.C details the process of rescinding agency 
actions pursuant to the APA, specifically addressing the arbitrary and 
capricious standard and remedies for violations of that standard.71   
A. The Administrative Procedure Act as a Check on Agency Power  
The APA outlines the procedures used to hold federal agencies 
accountable to both the general public and the judiciary.72  The procedures 
laid out in the APA serve two main purposes: (1) promoting “agency 
accountability”73 and (2) instilling “confidence”74 in agency decisions.75  The 
APA requires agencies to articulate “reasoned analysis” for the 
implementation of policies76 and ensures that “interested persons” have an 
opportunity to fully respond to these reasons before the policy’s 
                                                          
 64. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992). 
 65. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015) (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 67. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 68. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 69. See infra Section II.A. 
 70. See infra Section II.B. 
 71. See infra Section II.C. 
 72. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).  
 73. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986). 
 74. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020). 
 75. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012) (describing how 
the requirements of the APA help mitigate possible appearances of agency impropriety).  The APA 
promotes agency accountability by requiring agencies to present proposed regulations to the public 
and by requiring the final regulations to be “logical outgrowths” of the initially proposed 
regulations.  See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 
626 F.3d 84, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding regulations neither arbitrary nor capricious where 
they were logical outgrowths of the initial proposal and where interested parties had sufficient notice 
of the regulations and opportunity to comment on them).  The APA also serves as a “check upon 
administrators,” ensuring accountability.  United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 
(1950).   
 76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983). 
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promulgation.77  This process promotes agency accountability insofar as it 
provides a public check on agencies’ authority to promulgate regulations.78  
These procedures also instill confidence in agency decisions by ensuring that 
the reasons provided are not retroactive “convenient litigating position[s],” 
but rather the true goals of the agency.79   
B. Reviewability of Agency Action under the APA 
The APA articulates the framework for judicial review of agency 
action.80  Section 706 of the APA governs the scope of that standard of 
review.81  Specifically, Section 706(2)(A) provides that decisions deemed 
“arbitrary” or “capricious” will be “set aside.”82  This standard of review is 
“narrow.” 83  This standard is narrow because when courts are determining 
whether agency action is “arbitrary” or “capricious,” their analysis is limited 
to the reasons the agency provided at the time of the initial action and the 
information the agency relied on at the time of that action.84  In reviewing 
whether a decision is arbitrary or capricious, courts are “not to substitute 
[their] judgment for that of the agency.”85  Review by the courts should assess 
only whether the decision was “based on consideration of the relevant factors 
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.”86  The presumption of 
judicial review applies unless a statute precludes such relief or the action is 
committed by law to agency discretion.87   
                                                          
 77. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (“After notice required by this 
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making 
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral 
presentation.”). 
 78. See generally id. §§ 500–96 (outlining the regulations by which agencies must abide). 
 79. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155 (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 
213 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 80. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (stating the APA “embodies the basic 
presumption of judicial review to one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action.’” (quoting 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702)). 
 81. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 82. Id. § 706(2)(A).  Compare P.R. Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 81 (1st Cir. 1993) (setting 
aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious where there were no “legitimate reasons” for 
the decision), with FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529–30 (2009) (declining to 
set aside the agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious where there was a reasonable rationale 
for the decision).  
 83. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 513 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (describing the arbitrary and capricious standard of 
review) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 84. Id. at 513–14. 
 85. Id. at 513 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 87. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
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1. Action Committed to Agency Discretion Is Reviewed Narrowly  
According to Section 701(a) of the APA, federal agency decisions are 
reviewable unless a statute precludes review or the agency has complete 
discretion over the action.88  Courts have read the exception relating to 
agency discretion in Section 701(a)(2) “quite narrowly” to “honor the 
presumption of review.”89  The exception has been historically confined to 
“administrative decision[s] traditionally left to agency discretion.”90  The 
category of decisions not subject to judicial review includes agencies’ 
choices not to pursue enforcement of their regulations,91 as such choices are 
“committed to an agency’s absolute discretion.”92 
C. Rescinding Agency Action under the APA  
According to Section 706 of the APA, a judicially reviewable agency 
action may be rescinded if that action is considered to be “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”93  
Under this standard of review, courts must consider only whether the 
agency’s action was based on a full “consideration of the relevant factors”94 
or whether there exists a “clear error of judgment.”95  An agency must 
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action” 96 that includes a “rational 
                                                          
 88. Id.  
 89. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361, 370 (2018); see Lincoln 
v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191 (1993) (explaining that the exceptions in Section 701(a)(2) are restricted 
to “those rare circumstances where the relevant statute ‘is drawn so that a court would have no 
meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion’” (quoting Heckler 
v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
 90. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 191; see Interstate Com. Comm’n v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 
282 (1987) (holding Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review of administrative decisions 
“traditionally” committed to agency discretion (quoting Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599, 601 (1988) (holding Section 701(a)(2) 
precludes judicial review in an area of executive action where courts rarely intervene out of 
“extraordinary deference”); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 818–19 (1992) (holding 
Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review in areas where “courts have long been hesitant to 
intrude”). 
 91. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.  In Heckler, the Court held that the Food and Drug 
Administration’s denial of a petition to prevent certain drugs for lethal injection was unreviewable 
as there was a “tradition” of committing to “an agency’s absolute discretion.”  Id.  Therefore, the 
decision to enforce or not enforce its policies was left up to the agency.  Id. at 837.  The Court 
identified a number of factors that corroborated its decision, including that “when an agency refuses 
to act” there is no action for courts to review.  Id. at 832. 
 92. Id. at 831.  
 93. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 94. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 95. Indep. Meat Packers Ass’n v. Butz, 526 F.2d 228, 238 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 966 (1976). 
 96. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
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connection between the facts found and the choice made.”97  Courts are 
prohibited from substituting their judgments for agency judgments.98  
However, courts may “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the 
agency’s path may be reasonably discerned.”99 
1. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
Agencies must adequately explain their actions to avoid arbitrary or 
capricious decisions that violate Section 706 of the APA.100  It is a 
“foundational principle of administrative law” that courts “may uphold 
agency action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the 
action.”101  Thus, judicial review of agency action is limited to the original 
reasons set forth by the agency upon implementation of its action.102  Courts 
may find these original reasons to be flawed if:  
[T]he agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended 
it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could 
not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.103   
Courts also find agency action arbitrary or capricious if the agency 
“does not take account of legitimate reliance” by the public on the status quo 
before the agency’s action.104  
                                                          
 97. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).  The Supreme 
Court requires agencies to “make findings that support [their] decision[s]” and mandates that those 
findings be “supported by substantial evidence.”  Id. 
 98. Id. at 168–69. 
 99. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 284, 286, 290 
(1974) (finding the Interstate Commerce Commission’s decision neither arbitrary nor capricious 
where there was “substantial evidence” that allowed the Court to “discern” the path the agency took 
to justify its rule); see also Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 324 U.S. 581, 595 
(1945) (finding the reasoning behind the Federal Power Commission’s decision neither arbitrary 
nor capricious where “the path which it followed [could] be discerned”).  
 100. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1000 (2005) 
(holding when agencies seek to change previously implemented rules, they must adequately address 
the basis for that change with a “reasoned explanation”).  
 101. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 758 (2015) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 
U.S. 80 (1943)).  
 102. Id. 
 103. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
 104. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996); see United States v. Pa. Indus. 
Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674–75 (1973) (noting the importance of reliance in arbitrary and 
capricious analysis).   
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a. Relevance of Reliance Interests 
The Supreme Court dictates that an agency must “be cognizant” of 
whether it induced a party to rely to its detriment on the agency’s policy or 
policies.105  The Court has held that “it would be arbitrary or capricious to 
ignore” any “serious reliance interests” that agencies’ prior policies 
incentivized.106  Accordingly, agencies must provide “more detailed 
justification[s]” for their decisions when they decide to rescind or reverse 
previously implemented policies that “ha[ve] engendered serious reliance 
interests.”107  Agencies need not show that a new policy is preferable to the 
existing policy it replaces unless that new policy (1) rests on factual findings 
that contradict the agency’s previous findings or (2) poses a harm to those 
who relied on the existing policy.108   
Supreme Court precedent not only requires agencies to weigh reliance 
interests when taking new action, but it also requires courts to weigh them 
when they review previous agency action.109  The Court declines to defer to 
an agency’s interpretation of its decision in cases where it determines that 
serious reliance interests are threatened.110  While the term “serious” in the 
context of reliance interests is left undefined, the Court tends to consider 
industry or pecuniary reliance interests “serious” enough to weigh.111  For 
                                                          
 105. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016). 
 106. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).  The Court has yet to 
directly define “serious” in the context of reliance interests but has found agency action arbitrary 
and capricious where industry and pecuniary interests are at stake.  See, e.g., infra notes 112–116; 
see also Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 921 F.3d 1102, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (finding agency action 
was arbitrary and capricious when it departed from a prior nonenforcement policy because it 
“fail[ed] to consider . . . the reliance interests” of regulated parties and others).  While National 
Lifeline Association was a decision from the District Court for the District of Columbia rather than 
the Supreme Court, the district court relied on Supreme Court precedent in its analysis of reliance 
interests.  Id. 
 107. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515.  While the Fox majority noted the importance of 
weighing reliance interests, it did not focus its analysis on Fox’s reliance on prior FCC policy in the 
opinion.  Id.  Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence in part and concurrence in the judgment, also 
contended that reliance interests “have weight” in APA analysis, but did not go so far as to weigh 
those interests.  Id. at 536 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and concurring in part).   
 108. Id. at 515. 
 109. See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 159 (2012) (addressing 
the agency’s failure to meaningfully consider reliance interests then proceeding to weigh those 
interests to determine the validity of the agency’s action).  
 110. See id. at 158 (declining to defer to the Department of Labor’s new policy interpretation in 
part because the “agency’s announcement of its interpretation [was] preceded by a very lengthy 
period of conspicuous inaction” on which the pharmaceutical industry reasonably relied); Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019) (noting that courts should not defer to an agency interpretation 
that “creates unfair surprise or upsets reliance interests”); Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 
597, 613–14 (2013) (reiterating that agency interpretations that upset reliance interests may lose 
their deferential weight). 
 111. See infra notes 112–116 (providing examples of instances where the Court has considered 
pecuniary interests significant). 
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example, the Court has considered the reliance interests of the 
pharmaceutical industry,112 car dealerships,113 mortgage bankers,114 
purchasing departments of aerospace companies,115 and out-of-state 
customers of credit card companies serious enough to weigh.116  While the 
Court does not always find the industry reliance detrimental enough to 
rescind the agency action, it still weighs those interests.117 
Challengers alleging detrimental reliance on prior agency policies must 
“specifically identif[y]” the harm or potential harm to their interest, 
demonstrate that the harm was “reasonably incurred,” and “causally tie[]” the 
harm to the agency action.118  As noted above, relevant harms have 
traditionally been pecuniary.119  Where challengers can prove that they 
reasonably relied to their detriment on a previous agency interpretation of its 
regulation, courts will hold the new regulation invalid.120   
                                                          
 112. Christopher, 567 U.S. at 158 (declining to defer to the agency’s new interpretation of its 
regulation because the interpretation was directly contrary to long-standing pharmaceutical industry 
practice and thus would unfairly burden employers). 
 113. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126 (declining to defer to the agency’s most recently promulgated 
regulation because the car dealership industry had relied on the agency’s previous regulation to 
negotiate and structure employee compensation plans). 
 114. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n., 575 U.S. 92, 106 (2015) (reiterating the importance of 
weighing whether the “prior policy ha[d] engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken 
into account” but not finding those reliance interests serious enough to rescind the Department of 
Labor’s new policy (quoting Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515)). 
 115. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974) (noting the 
importance of weighing “[t]he possible reliance of [the aerospace] industry on the [National Labor 
Relations] Board’s past decisions with respect to buyers”). 
 116. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (noting the importance of 
weighing credit card holders’ “legitimate reliance on prior interpretation”). 
 117. See, e.g., Perez, 575 U.S. at 106 (finding agency action permissible despite real estate 
finance companies’ reliance on prior policy regarding mortgage loan officers’ exemption from 
minimum wage requirements).  
 118. Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2020).  In Paralyzed Veterans of 
America v. D.C. Arena L.P., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit contended 
that parties must prove that they relied on prior agency policy to trigger an arbitrary and capricious 
determination.  117 F.3d 579, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  The strict rule in Paralyzed Veterans was 
ultimately overruled by the Supreme Court in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, but the 
majority still considered the reliance interests in that case.  Perez, 575 U.S. at 106. 
 119. For example, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, the Supreme Court considered the reliance 
interests of the Bell Aerospace company in the context of whether there were “fines or damages” 
incurred due to a change in prior policy.  416 U.S. at 295.  The Court considered similar fines-based 
reliance interests in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. 556 U.S. 502, 506 (2009). 
 120. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016) (invalidating the 
agency’s new regulation where “decades of industry reliance” were at issue); Bell Aerospace, 416 
U.S. at 295 (upholding the agency’s new interpretation where petitioners had not shown “adverse 
consequences ensuing” from their reliance); Alaska Pro. Hunters Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (invalidating agency interpretation that upset thirty years of 
reliance on contradictory advice from local agency officials); Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 587 
(upholding the agency’s new interpretation where petitioners had not “reasonably relied to their 
detriment” on the agency’s previous interpretation).   
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2. Judicial Review of Agency Action 
Judicial review of agency action is limited to “the grounds on which the 
agency acted.”121  Rather than striking a proposed action entirely, “remanding 
[the action] to the agency . . . is the preferred course.”122  If a court finds the 
grounds the agency acted on to be inadequate, the court can remand the case 
for the agency to either provide “a fuller explanation” of the reasoning the 
agency employed “at the time of the agency action”123 or “deal with the 
problem afresh” by taking new action that includes new or better-articulated 
reasons.124  A fuller articulation or new action is required because allowing 
agencies to invoke belated, unrelated justifications for their actions upsets 
“the orderly functioning of the process of review.”125   
a. Remedying by Providing a Fuller Explanation  
When an agency decides to provide a fuller explanation for the 
reasoning it employed at the time it took the action, it may not provide new 
reasons for its action, but instead must better articulate its original reasons.126  
The Court has held that agencies must “cogently explain” their decisions.127  
Lower courts have permitted agencies to provide “amplified 
articulation[s]”128 of prior “conclusory” reasons.129  Notably, agencies are not 
permitted to engage in “post hoc rationalizations” of their actions; these 
“cannot serve as sufficient predicate” for their actions.130   
                                                          
 121. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015). 
 122. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990). 
 123. Id.  
 124. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201 (1947).  
 125. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).  
 126. Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142–43 (1973) (per curiam). 
 127. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 48 (1983).  
An agency does not explain “cogently” when it relies “on factors which Congress has not intended 
it to consider,” neglects to consider an important aspect of the problem, offers “an explanation for 
its decision that runs counter to the evidence,” or uses reasoning “so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”  Id. at 43.  Additionally, an 
agency’s decision is cogently explained when it does not rely on post hoc rationalizations of its 
reasoning.  Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971).  Post hoc 
rationalizations are impermissible whether they come from agencies, agency attorneys, or reviewing 
courts.  Id.; Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94. 
 128. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 546 F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
 129. Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting A.L. Pharma, Inc. v. 
Shalala, 62 F.3d 1484, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).  In Alpharma, the district court held that the reasons 
the Food and Drug Administration supplied on remand after a challenge to its initial decision were 
not post hoc rationalizations because they expanded on the agency’s original reasons, and thus were 
sufficient to justify its position.  Id. at 6–7 (citing Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 546 F.2d at 992). 
 130. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 539 (1981); see Overton Park, 401 
U.S. at 419 (rejecting litigation affidavits from agency officials as impermissible post hoc 
rationalizations of inadequate agency reasons).  
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b. Remedying by Taking New Action 
An agency may respond to a challenge to its action by rescinding the 
initial action and taking new action premised on novel or different 
reasoning.131  Thus when an agency decides to take new action to implement 
a challenged policy, it is not limited by the reasons it articulated in its initial 
action.132  The agency may supply entirely different reasons than those upon 
which it originally relied, provided the agency complies with the procedural 
requirements for agency action.133  Requiring a new agency decision before 
permitting new justifications is more than just “an idle and useless 
formality.”134  This requirement ensures “agency accountability” by forcing 
agencies to properly justify their exercises of authority.135  
III. THE COURT’S REASONING  
Writing for a five justice majority, Chief Justice Roberts first clarified 
that “all parties agree[d]” that DHS could rescind the program, therefore that 
issue was not at stake.136  The majority identified three issues that were at 
stake in the DACA rescission: (1) whether the APA claims were reviewable, 
(2) whether the rescission was arbitrary and capricious, and (3) whether the 
respondents put forth a viable equal protection claim.137  The majority found 
the claims to be reviewable and the rescission to be arbitrary and capricious 
in violation of the APA, but did not find the respondents’ equal protection 
claims viable.138   
The majority held that the claims were reviewable under the APA.139  
The Court determined that the DACA memorandum was more than just “a 
passive non-enforcement policy.”140  Deferral constituted a series of 
                                                          
 131. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). 
 132. See generally id. (upholding new action taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) on a previously litigated issue because the novel reasons the agency employed in the second 
action were based on substantial evidence, consistent with the SEC’s authority, and clearly 
articulated). 
 133. Id.; see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764–65 (1969) (holding the 
NLRB’s action invalid for failure to comply with procedural requirements, but allowing the action 
based on subsequent properly-enacted adjudications).  
 134. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. at 766 n.6 (holding that remanding on account of improper 
implementation procedure would be “an idle and useless formality”).  
 135. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 643 (1986). 
 136. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1905 (2020). 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. at 1915 (“None of these points, either singly or in concert, establishes a plausible equal 
protection claim.”)  
 139. Id. at 1905. 
 140. A “passive non-enforcement policy” would be unreviewable as an expression of agency 
discretion.  Id. at 1905–06. 
  
128 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 80:113 
individualized adjudications, and DACA conferred benefits in addition to 
simply deferring removal.141   
After finding the claims to be reviewable,142 the majority held that the 
rescission was arbitrary and capricious.143  To rescind DACA, the APA 
required DHS to either explain its reasons at the time of the initial rescission 
in more detail or take new action rescinding the program.144  Secretary 
Nielsen opted to further explain the decision rather than take new action.145  
The majority found that her explanation was inadequate because her reasons 
neither matched nor elaborated on Secretary Duke’s reasons.146  The majority 
held that the decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious because 
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] 
of the problem,” including alternatives to achieving the Trump 
Administration’s policy goals and the reliance interests of DACA 
recipients.147   
The majority also held that the respondents had not adequately stated an 
equal protection claim because they did not raise “a plausible inference that 
the rescission was motivated by animus.”148  The majority determined that 
the “disparate impact of the rescission” on Latinx immigrants from Mexico, 
the “unusual history” of the rescission, and President Trump’s statements on 
immigration—even taken together—could not establish a plausible equal 
protection claim.149  They found nothing presented by the respondents to be 
credibly indicative of animus: Mexican immigrants would be expected to 
                                                          
 141. Id.  
 142. The majority also determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the claims despite the 
government’s argument that provisions in the INA were independent bars to review.  Id. at 1907. 
The majority found the provisions in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) to be narrow, holding that 
the rescission “is not a decision to ‘commence proceedings’” or “to ‘adjudicate’ a case or ‘execute’ 
a removal order.”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). 
 143. Id. at 1915. 
 144. Id. at 1908. 
 145. Id. at 1908–10.   
 146. Id.  The majority found that Secretary Nielsen’s reasoning bore “little relationship” to 
Secretary Duke’s reasoning.  Id. at 1908.  Because Secretary Nielsen was limited to DHS’s original 
reasons, her memorandum failed to satisfy the explanation requirement.  Id.  The majority also 
determined that the timing of the Nielsen memorandum was problematic, as the APA requires 
“contemporaneous explanations.”  Id. at 1908–09. 
 147. Id. at 1910–15 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  Specifically, the majority quoted Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., holding that “when an agency rescinds a prior policy its 
reasoned analysis must consider the ‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the existing 
[policy].’”  Id. at 1913 (alteration in original).  Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum did not consider 
forbearance at all––not even in the context of maintaining the forbearance policy without the 
attendant benefits as an alternative to rescission.  Id.  The Court also contended that Secretary 
Duke’s memorandum failed to consider any reliance interests of DACA recipients.  Id. at 1914.   
 148. Id. at 1916. 
 149. Id. at 1915. 
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make up a large share of those affected as they make up a large share of 
immigrants, the history of DACA’s rescission was not irregular because 
agencies often rescind prior actions, and President Trump’s inflammatory 
statements were too “remote in time” and made in contexts too “unrelated” 
to be considered in the animus calculation.150   
Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in 
part.151  She agreed with the majority on the issues of reviewability and 
arbitrary and capriciousness, but disagreed on the issue of equal protection.152  
Justice Sotomayor would have permitted respondents’ equal protection 
claims to proceed on remand because each complaint “set forth particularized 
facts that plausibly allege[d] discriminatory animus.”153  Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized the relevance and weight of the respondents’ three “factors” 154 
of discrimination and chastised the majority for “bypassing context.”155  
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch, concurred 
in the judgment in part and dissented in part.156  The Justices agreed with the 
majority on the issue of equal protection but disagreed on the issues of 
reviewability and arbitrary and capriciousness.157  Justice Thomas took a 
“two wrongs make a right” approach: DACA was implemented “unilaterally” 
and by “mere memorandum,” so it could be rescinded the same way.158  He 
reiterated that DACA was “unlawful from its inception”159 and argued that 
“[s]o long as the agency’s determination of illegality is sound, our review 
should be at an end.”160  He also cited the “perverse incentives”161 created by 
the majority’s decision, asserting that the majority’s decision would make it 
                                                          
 150. Id. at 1915–16.  For a discussion on the Supreme Court’s inconsistent willingness to 
consider political statements in equal protection analysis, see Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York v. Cuomo. 141 S. Ct. 63, 80 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (per curiam) (noting that the Court considered important Governor Cuomo’s comments 
on religion in the context of COVID-19 restrictions but did not consider important then-President 
Trump’s comments on religion in the context of immigration restrictions in Trump v. Hawaii). 
 151. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1917 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, 
and dissenting in part). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1915 (majority opinion).  
 155. Id. at 1918 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment, and dissenting 
in part).  
 156. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 1919.  Justice Thomas cited the INA’s “elaborate statutory scheme” as a reason DHS 
had “no discretion to create an additional class” of noncitizens eligible for lawful presence.  Id. at 
1923.  
 160. Id. at 1919.  Justice Thomas determined that “[t]he decision to rescind an unlawful agency 
action is per se lawful,” thus DACA’s rescission—no matter the form—was appropriate.  Id. at 
1922.  
 161. Id. at 1919. 
  
130 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW ONLINE [VOL. 80:113 
more difficult for future administrations to undo illegal actions by their 
predecessors.162  Ultimately, Justice Thomas also found that “DHS did 
provide a sufficient explanation for its action” by citing the Attorney 
General’s determination of DACA’s illegality.163  
Justice Alito also concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in 
part.164  He argued that the Court did “not resolve the question of DACA’s 
rescission,” but rather told DHS “to go back and try [to rescind the program] 
again.”165  Justice Alito agreed with Justice Thomas’s points regarding 
DACA’s unlawfulness and DHS’s adequate explanation of rescission.166  He 
took issue with the fact that DACA’s rescission was prevented for the whole 
of President Trump’s term in office.167   
Justice Kavanaugh, too, concurred in the judgment in part and dissented 
in part, arguing that DHS had offered sufficient explanation for DACA’s 
rescission in Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum, and that her memorandum 
was not an impermissible post hoc rationalization of agency action.168  He 
asserted that the post hoc rationalization prohibition applied to agency 
lawyers or reviewing judges, but not necessarily agency decisionmakers 
themselves.169  Justice Kavanaugh also contended that Secretary Nielsen’s 
memorandum constituted “new” 170 agency action, and was therefore 
permissible under the APA.171  
                                                          
 162. Id. at 1928.  
 163. Id.  
 164. Id. at 1932 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id.  
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 1933 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 169. Id. at 1934 (“Under our precedents, however, the post hoc justification doctrine merely 
requires that courts assess agency action based on the official explanations of the agency 
decisionmakers, and not based on after-the-fact explanations advanced by agency lawyers during 
litigation (or by judges).” (emphasis in original)).  In this case, Secretary Nielsen made the post hoc 
rationalizations in her memorandum responding to the Duke memorandum, not agency lawyers 
during litigation.  See id. at 1909 (majority opinion) (noting that “the problem is the timing, not the 
speaker”).  Justice Kavanaugh premised his argument on cases like State Farm, which noted that 
“courts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency actions.”  Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).  In his Regents 
dissent, Justice Kavanaugh implied that while post hoc rationalizations by lawyers or judges are 
impermissible, such rationalizations, when made by agency officials like Secretary Nielsen, are 
permissible.  See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part) (asserting that the post hoc rationalization doctrine is “directed at reviewing 
courts,” but not agencies (quoting Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir 2006))). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  Harkening back to the majority’s contention that DHS had to either reasonably explain 
their decision or “‘deal with the problem afresh’ by taking new agency action,” id. at 1908 (majority 
opinion), Justice Kavanaugh found that Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum constituted a “‘rule’ 
setting forth ‘an agency statement of general . . . applicability’” and thus fulfilled the ‘new “agency 
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IV. ANALYSIS  
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California, the Supreme Court held that the Trump Administration’s 
rescission of DACA violated Section 706 of the APA because it was arbitrary 
and capricious.172  The Court found that the reasoning DHS articulated in 
Secretary Nielsen’s second DACA memorandum was too attenuated from 
Secretary Duke’s first DACA memorandum and that the Nielsen 
memorandum “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem.”173  
The Court briefly referenced the reliance interests at stake, but was careful to 
note that such interests are “noteworthy concerns, but they are not necessarily 
dispositive.”174   
The majority in Regents properly applied some required elements of 
arbitrary and capricious analysis, like the need for contemporaneous 
explanations and thoughtful consideration of policy alternatives, but failed to 
address a crucial element of that analysis: the reliance interests at stake in 
rescinding DACA.175  Not only did Dreamers reasonably rely to their 
detriment on the agency’s policy, but many other Americans did, too.176  
These interests are both tangible and intangible, and they affect the lives of 
millions of people.177  Thus, while the Court correctly concluded that the 
recission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious,178 the Court incorrectly 
dismissed the serious reliance interests induced by the program as not 
dispositive.179  
                                                          
action’ requirement for rescinding DACA.  Id.  at 1933 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)). 
 172. Id. at 1910 (majority opinion). 
 173. Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Secretary Nielsen’s reasoning only supported a partial 
recission of DACA and failed to address viable alternative policies.  Id. at 1912–13. 
 174. Id. at 1914. 
 175. See infra Section IV.B. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  Tangible interests include purchasing homes and starting businesses, and intangible 
interests include cultivating diverse communities and protection from deportation.  See infra Section 
IV.B (addressing the importance of reliance interests in APA arbitrary and capricious analysis and 
detailing the reliance interests of Dreamers and other Americans based on the existence of the 
DACA program). 
 178. See infra Section IV.A. 
 179. See infra Section IV.B. 
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A. The Court Properly Held that the Rescission of DACA was Arbitrary 
and Capricious. 
The APA requires agencies’ decision-making to be “reasoned”180 and 
requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside” decisions that are “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law.”181  Here, the Court properly held that DACA’s recission was arbitrary 
and capricious.182  The reasons Secretary Nielsen provided in her 
memorandum did not derive from those provided in Secretary Duke’s initial 
memorandum,183 and DHS ignored potential alternatives to recission.184  
Moreover, the rescission appeared to be an attempt to indulge President 
Trump and implement his anti-immigrant agenda.185  Policies that intimately 
affect hundreds of thousands of lives186 cannot—and should not—be 
                                                          
 180. Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 750 (2015) (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 181. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  In their review, courts are limited to 
“the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action.”  Michigan, 576 U.S. at 758.  
Additionally, courts must determine whether agencies considered alternatives to their proposed 
policies that are “within the ambit of the existing” policy.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983); see supra Section II.B. 
 182. See supra Section II.C.1. 
 183. See infra Section IV.A.1. 
 184. See infra Section IV.A.2. 
 185. For examples of how the Trump Administration’s policies were both blatantly and subtly 
anti-immigrant, see Mónica Verea, Anti-Immigrant and Anti-Mexican Attitudes and Policies during 
the First 18 Months of the Trump Administration, 13 NORTEAMÉRICA 197 (2018); Ted Hesson & 
Chris Kahn, Trump Pushes Anti-immigrant Message Even as Coronavirus Dominates Campaign, 
REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2020, 6:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-immigration-
insight/trump-pushes-anti-immigrant-message-even-as-coronavirus-dominates-campaign-
idUSKCN25A18W; Michael D. Shear & Miriam Jordan, Undoing Trump’s Anti-Immigrant 
Policies Will Mean Looking at the Fine Print, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2021), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/10/us/politics/trump-biden-us-immigration-system.html; 
Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, Trump Says Administration Will Try Again to End ‘Dreamers’ 
Program, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19/us/politics/trump-
daca.html; Stuart Anderson, A Review of Trump Immigration Policy, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2020, 2:01 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2020/08/26/fact-check-and-review-of-trump-
immigration-policy/?sh=1cbfcee556c0; Leila Schochet, Trump’s Immigration Policies Are 
Harming American Children, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 31, 2017, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/early-childhood/reports/2017/07/31/436377/trumps-
immigration-policies-harming-american-children/; Peniel Ibe, Trump’s Attacks on the Legal 
Immigration System Explained, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.afsc.org/blogs/news-and-commentary/trumps-attacks-legal-immigration-system-
explained. 
 186. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020).  
“Hundreds of thousands” is an extremely conservative estimate: DACA affects the lives of its 
recipients, but it also affects the rest of the American population.  DACA Facts: The Case for 
Protecting Dreamers, FWD.US (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.fwd.us/news/daca-facts/.  DACA 
recipients contribute more than $42 billion to the country’s annual gross domestic product.  Id.  
Dreamers also pay billions in taxes every year.  Id.  More important than economics, Dreamers add 
value to American society: they work and attend schools, launch their own businesses, and enrich 
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rescinded by unelected agency leaders187 for their own political gain.188  
Because both the stated and unstated reasons for DACA’s rescission were 
problematic, the Court correctly considered the attempted rescission arbitrary 
and capricious.189  
1. The Court Correctly Determined that DHS Failed to Articulate 
Acceptable Reasons for Rescission.  
The Court correctly decided that DHS’s inadequate reasoning failed 
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard.190  Chief Justice Roberts 
noted that when an agency chooses to elaborate on its initial explanation of 
the agency action instead of taking new action with new reasoning, courts 
must review the explanations “critically.”191  As discussed above, the Trump 
Administration initially attempted to rescind DACA through the Duke 
memorandum in September of 2017.192  The Duke memorandum provided a 
bare-bones explanation for rescission that rested almost entirely on then-
Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s determination that DACA was illegal.193  
The Duke memorandum contained no reference to the reasonable reliance 
interests of DACA recipients and no evidence that DHS had considered 
                                                          
communities with diverse cultures and perspectives.  Id.; Joe McCarthy, 5 Ways Immigration 
Actually Enhances a Country’s Culture, GLOB. CITIZEN (July 18, 2018), 
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/how-immigrants-benefit-society-trump/; see also infra 
notes 267–269 and accompanying text. 
 187. Even President Trump recognizes the dangers of “unaccountable,” unelected leaders 
dictating the law.  Eric Katz, Trump Signs Orders to Restrict ‘Unaccountable Bureaucrats’ from 
Creating Backdoor Regulations, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/10/trump-signs-orders-restrict-unaccountable-
bureaucrats-creating-backdoor-regulations/160493/.   
 188. It is clear that Secretaries Duke and Nielsen attempted to rescind the program for their own 
political gain because they could not––and did not––articulate valid reasons for the rescission.  See 
infra Section IV.A.1.  Rather, the Secretaries bowed to political pressure from the Trump 
Administration and cited surface-level, insufficient reasons.  See, e.g., Michael D. Shear, Julie 
Hirschfeld & Adam Liptak, How the Trump Administration Eroded Its Own Legal Case on DACA, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/us/politics/supreme-court-
dreamers-case.html; see also infra notes 212–220 and accompanying text.  
 189. See infra Sections IV.A.1 and IV.A.2. 
 190. See infra notes 191–234 and accompanying text.  
 191. See generally Fifth Amendment – Due Process Clause – Equal Protection – Department of 
Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California, 134 HARV. L. REV. 510, 513 (2020) 
(quoting Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908) (noting the emphasis Chief Justice Roberts places on the level 
of scrutiny used in reviewing agency action). 
 192. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 193. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908.  The Duke memorandum also mentioned the ongoing litigation 
around DAPA as a reason to rescind DACA.  It assumed but did not explain that the legal 
foundations of DAPA and DACA were the same, thus if one fell so should the other.  See Duke 
Memo, supra note 47.  
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alternatives to the program, despite allegedly “[r]ecognizing the complexities 
associated with winding down the program.”194  
By failing to meaningfully address anything other than the Attorney 
General’s illegality determination and the ongoing DAPA litigation, DHS 
“failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the problem.”195  Secretary 
Duke’s memorandum, while discussing both DACA and DAPA, did not 
distinguish between the programs despite their marked differences.196  Under 
the DACA program, about 700,000 noncitizens who entered the United 
States illegally as children received a renewable two-year forbearance of 
removal (deferred action), work authorization, and access to related federal 
benefits.197  The DAPA program would have conferred the same forbearance, 
work authorization, and associated benefits to more than 4.3 million 
noncitizens—more than six times the number of noncitizens benefitting from 
DACA—whose children were United States citizens or lawful permanent 
residents.198  
The obvious difference between the programs is the circumstances of 
the qualifying individuals.199  Dreamers “know only this country as home.”200  
The only individuals who could qualify for DACA’s protections were those 
who (1) were under the age of thirty-one in 2012; (2) lived in the United 
States continuously since 2007; (3) were current students, high school 
graduates, or honorably discharged veterans; (4) had never been convicted of 
a serious crime; and (5) did not threaten national security or public safety.201  
DACA’s protections applied to a much smaller subsection of the population 
than DAPA, whose protections extended to those who (1) were parents of 
                                                          
 194. Duke Memo, supra note 47; Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 195. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  The 
Court relied heavily on State Farm in its analysis.  Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912.  In State Farm, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) promulgated a regulation that 
required automobiles manufactured after 1982 to be equipped with passive restraints, either 
automatic seatbelts or airbags.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 37–38.  Prior to the regulation going into 
effect, NHTSA decided that automatic seatbelts were not sufficiently protective and proceeded to 
rescind the regulation in full even though airbags were still considered to be sufficiently protective.  
Id. at 38.  The Court concluded that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious because NHTSA did 
not consider implementing an airbag-only policy and failed to explain its rationale for not doing so.  
Id. at 51. 
 196. Duke Memo, supra note 47; see also Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Memorandum from Secretary 
Kirstjen M. Nielsen, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/18_0622_S1_Memorandum_DACA.pdf  
[hereinafter Nielsen Memo] (dismissing distinctions between DAPA and DACA by stating “[a]ny 
arguable distinctions between the DAPA and DACA policies are not sufficiently material to 
convince me that the DACA policy is lawful.”). 
 197. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1901. 
 198. Id. at 1902–03.  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1912 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 201. Id. at 1901. 
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United States citizens or lawful permanent residents as of November of 2014; 
(2) continuously lived in the United States since before 2010; (3) were 
physically present in the United States on November 20, 2014; (4) had no 
lawful immigration status; (5) did not fall within DHS’s enforcement 
priorities; and (6) “present[ed] no other factors that, in the exercise of 
discretion, ma[de] [ ] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”202  By 
failing to address the significant differences between DACA and DAPA, and 
assigning the perceived problems with DAPA to DACA, Secretary Duke did 
not provide adequate reasons for DACA’s rescission.203  The decision-first-
explanation-later approach will render this type of agency action arbitrary 
and capricious, as it necessitates impermissible post hoc rationalizations.204 
The Nielsen memorandum, too, failed to provide adequate reasons for 
DACA’s rescission.205  Secretary Nielsen could have defended Secretary 
Duke’s DACA rescission in two ways: she could have (1) elaborated on 
Secretary Duke’s reasoning or (2) taken new agency action premised on new 
or additional reasons that were not present in the Duke memorandum.206  
Secretary Nielsen chose not to take new agency action; so, to justify the 
rescission, she was required to elaborate on Secretary Duke’s reasoning.207  
She did not; instead, Secretary Nielsen chose to present three new, 
“meaningfully distinct” reasons for DACA’s rescission.208   
Secretary Nielsen’s first reason did address the heart of the Duke 
memorandum—the Attorney General’s determination that DACA was 
illegally implemented—but it merely repeated Secretary Duke’s analysis 
rather than elaborating on it.209  The Court has reiterated time after time that 
                                                          
 202. John F. Kelly, Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”), DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (June 15, 
2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-action-
parents-americans-and-lawful. 
 203. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1911–12. 
 204. See id. at 135 (highlighting the arbitrariness of decisions not stemming from agency 
expertise).  In certain instances, this type of approach may be justified, for example when agencies 
wait until after notice-and-comment periods to explain the rationale behind their policy choices.  
Christopher J. Walker, What the DACA Rescission Case Means for Administrative Law: A New 
Frontier for Chenery I’s Ordinary Remand Rule, YALE J. REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (June 19, 
2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-the-daca-rescission-case-means-for-administrative-law-
a-new-frontier-for-chenery-is-ordinary-remand-rule/.  DHS did not provide a notice-and-comment 
period when it rescinded DACA.  Gabriella D’Agostini, No Status, No Notice, No Comment: The 
Lack of Procedural Adherence to the APA Notice and Comment Requirement Concerning 
Immigration Rules, MICH. J. ENV’T ADMIN. L. BLOG (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.mjeal-
online.org/no-status-no-notice-no-comment-the-lack-of-procedural-adherence-to-the-apa-notice-
and-comment-requirement-concerning-immigration-rules/. 
 205. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908–09. 
 206. Id. at 1908. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
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when an agency seeks to elaborate on the reasons for its implementation of 
or change in a policy, it must rely on and better explain the initial reasons it 
presented when first attempting the action.210  Secretary Nielsen’s second and 
third reasons, which were maintaining public confidence in the rule of law 
and various policy reasons, including a preference for legislative fixes, were 
never mentioned in the Duke memorandum.211   
While the Regents majority did not address this point, one wonders 
whether the lack of consistent, reasoned analysis in the memoranda 
demonstrates the “foregone conclusion” of the DACA rescission.212  
Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum purporting to fix the flaws in the Duke 
memorandum was a “boldly and blatantly results-oriented”213 attempt to 
dismantle a program politically unpopular for her appointer, President 
Trump.  Secretaries Duke and Nielsen served as “rubber stamp[s]”214 for 
President Trump’s immigration priorities,215 effectively disregarding their 
APA-imposed duty to provide reasonably explained decisions with 
legitimate motivations.216  The timelines of the Secretaries’ employment is 
illustrative.217  While the Secretaries executed policy priorities that President 
                                                          
 210. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 417 (1971); Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 760 (2015).  Better explaining their initial 
reasoning ensures that agencies cannot “conceal the real motivations and considerations behind the 
administrative policies.”  Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary 
Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 564 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the Court 
defended the tradition of agency transparency, which furthers the democratic process by allowing 
the public to accurately assess its government.  Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) 
Accountability: Open Government in the United States, 31 YALE. L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 80 (2012).  
Agency transparency is especially important because agency leaders are unelected officials who 
cannot be held accountable by the people through the democratic process the way that elected 
leaders can.  Michael Halberstam, Beyond Transparency: Rethinking Election Reform from an Open 
Government Perspective, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1007, 1007–08 (2015).  For government to be truly 
representative, citizens must have insight into the actual motivations of agencies.  Id. 
 211. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1908. 
 212. Jonathan Blitzer, The Trump Administration’s Plot to End DACA Faces a Supreme Court 
Test, NEW YORKER (Nov. 10, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-trump-
administrations-plot-to-end-daca-faces-a-supreme-court-test. 
 213. R. Parker Sheffy & Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Appellate Exceptionalism? The Troubling Case 
of Immigration Decisions’ Continued Precedential Effect Even After Circuit Court Vacatur, 2020 
U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 129, 135 (“Decisions which are not the result of agency expertise but are 
rather boldly and blatantly results-oriented are similarly likely arbitrary and capricious.  The 
Supreme Court’s recent decision finding the government’s attempted rescission of the DACA 
Program to be arbitrary and capricious is an excellent example.”).  The authors also note that 
“unfairness and injustice” result from this kind of approach.  Id. at 138. 
 214. Blitzer, supra note 212. 
 215. One of the Trump Administration’s stated immigration priorities was rescinding DACA.  
See Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, supra note 185. 
 216. See supra Section II.C. 
 217. See Nick Miroff, Top Homeland Security Official, Who Clashed with White House Over 
Immigration Policy, to Step Down, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2018, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-homeland-security-official-who-
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Trump liked, they were safe in their positions.218  However, as soon as the 
Secretaries executed a policy that he did not like, they were forced to 
resign.219  Secretaries Duke and Nielsen knew that if they wanted to maintain 
their positions they had to appease the President, so that is what they did.220  
Because the Nielsen memorandum could be construed as a political ploy that 
failed to elaborate on the Duke memorandum’s only stated reason and 
asserted new reasons not provided by Secretary Duke, the Court correctly 
determined that the Nielsen memorandum was an impermissible “post hoc 
rationalization[]”221 in violation of the APA.222 
Moreover, the Regents majority found that neither the Duke 
memorandum nor the Nielsen memorandum contained reasoning that 
considered the reasonable, legitimate reliance interests223 induced by the 
DACA program.224  Where an affected party relied on an agency’s prior 
policy, the agency is required to explain why its interest outweighs the party’s 
                                                          
clashed-with-white-house-over-immigration-policy-to-step-down/2018/02/23/c3659d66-18e4-
11e8-942d-16a950029788_story.html (providing the timeline of Secretary Duke’s employment); 
Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear, & Eric Schmitt, Kirstjen Nielsen 
Resigns as Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/07/us/politics/kirstjen-nielsen-dhs-resigns.html (providing the 
timeline of Secretary Nielsen’s employment).  
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.  Secretary Duke refused to end the Temporary Protected Status program, which protects 
thousands of immigrants fleeing violence or disasters.  Miroff, supra note 217.  Secretary Nielsen 
refused to block all immigrants from seeking asylum.  Kanno-Youngs, Haberman, Shear, & Schmitt, 
supra note 217.  After these refusals, President Trump pushed the Secretaries out of their positions.  
Id.  
 220. See, e.g., Elizabeth Williamson & Ron Nixon, Kirstjen Nielsen Was a Target of Trump’s 
Immigration Ire. Now She’s His Protector., N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/politics/nielsen-trump-immigration-protector.html 
(detailing how Secretary Nielsen shielded former President Trump from criticism after politically 
damaging news of the Administration’s family separation policy broke). 
 221. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971) (citing Burlington 
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168–69 (1962)) (observing that post hoc rationalizations 
“have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review”).  The Court noted that agency 
action is arbitrary and capricious where “the decision was [not] based on a consideration of [all] 
relevant factors.”  Id. at 416.   
 222. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 104 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020). 
 223. See supra note 186 and accompanying text; see also infra Section IV.B. 
 224. Regents, 104 S. Ct. at 1913–14.  Reliance interests are some of the “relevant factors” 
discussed in the Court’s decision in Overton Park.  401 U.S. at 416; see also United States v. Pa. 
Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 674–75 (1973) (remanding the case to determine whether the 
company reasonably relied on the agency’s original interpretation of its regulation).  Without that 
determination, the Court could not consider all of the relevant factors and therefore could not 
determine whether the agency action was arbitrary or capricious.  Id.  Although the court recognized 
that DHS had not weighed the reliance interests in its reasoning, it also chose not to weigh those 
interests.  See infra Section IV.B for a more detailed discussion of the reliance interests at issue and 
the Court’s responsibility to weigh them. 
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interest.225  DHS argued that Secretaries Duke and Nielsen were not required 
to address any alleged reliance interests because DACA “conferred no 
substantive rights.”226  While it may not have conferred substantive rights, it 
did confer substantive benefits that warrant reliance interest analysis.227  Not 
only were Dreamers provided specific government-sponsored benefits in 
two-year increments,228 but Dreamers also received tangential benefits that 
were dependent upon DACA’s promises.229   
The Court noted that even if it took DHS’s argument that DACA 
recipients had no reasonable reliance interests at face value, the agency was 
required at least to address that contention in its rescission to comply with 
the APA.230  DHS did not articulate acceptable reasoning in either 
memorandum.231  In its first memorandum the reasoning rested solely on the 
Attorney General’s determination and did not take into account reliance 
interests.232  In its second memorandum DHS did not articulate acceptable 
reasoning because it failed to elaborate on the agency’s original reason and 
did not address reliance interests.233  These “omission[s] alone 
render[] . . . [the] decision arbitrary and capricious.”234 
2. The Court Correctly Determined that DHS Failed to Consider 
Viable Policy Alternatives. 
The Court also correctly used the APA’s arbitrary and capricious 
standard to analyze the issue of DHS’s failure to consider reasonable policy 
alternatives.235  In State Farm, the Court made clear what it alluded to in 
Overton Park: agency decisions are not “unimpeachable.”236  Agencies are 
required to at least consider “feasible and prudent alternative[s]” before 
enacting contemplated changes.237  This consideration helps maintain the 
                                                          
 225. Cf. John Gedid, Administrative Procedure for the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction 
to the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 241, 276 (2012) 
(analyzing the 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act in the context of the Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
 226. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913 (quoting Application to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020) (No.18-587), p. 125a). 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  The government-sponsored benefits include, but are not limited to, Social Security 
numbers and Medicare eligibility.  Id. at 1902. 
 229. See, e.g., supra note 177; see also infra Section IV.B. 
 230. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1913–14. 
 231. Id. at 1908–14. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 1913. 
 235. See infra notes 236–253 and accompanying text. 
 236. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983). 
 237. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 408 (1971). 
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status quo, which mitigates the risk of upsetting reasonable reliance 
interests.238  It is especially important in the context of DACA because of 
Dreamers’ serious reliance on the policy.239 
In the first DACA rescission memorandum, Secretary Duke made no 
attempt to explain why DACA’s forbearance policy could not be divorced 
from benefits eligibility.240  When making his illegality determination, 
Attorney General Sessions focused only on the conferral of benefits.241  He 
“neither addressed the forbearance policy at the heart of DACA nor 
compelled DHS to abandon that policy.”242  Although Secretary Duke was 
left with the option to remove benefits eligibility while leaving the 
forbearance policy untouched, she declined to consider this option.243  In the 
second DACA rescission memorandum, Secretary Nielsen also made no 
attempt to explain why the program’s forbearance and benefits policies could 
not be separated.244 
The ability to separate the forbearance and benefits policies in DACA 
was critical in the Court’s determination because, according to the 
government, the benefits component of the program was what made DACA 
illegal.245  While the APA does not require agencies to consider all policy 
alternatives,246 DHS was required to consider the efficacy of a forbearance-
only policy because it was “within the ambit of the existing” policy.247  
                                                          
 238. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009) (noting the 
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 243. Id.  Given DHS’s supposed familiarity with proper APA policy, it is unclear why Secretary 
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could be pressure from the Trump Administration to end the policy, no matter the manner.  See 
Blitzer, supra note 212 (explaining how Trump’s DHS served as a “rubber stamp” for his policies). 
 244. Id. at 1908–09; Nielsen Memo, supra note 196.  Secretary Nielsen’s enthusiasm to end the 
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supra note 220. 
 245. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1912–13.  The government could have precluded Dreamers from 
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could have amended the regulations codified in the Code of Federal Regulations that conferred the 
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 246. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51. 
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DACA has two components: deferred action and benefits eligibility.248  The 
heart of DACA, however, is its deferred action, or forbearance, policy.249  
Forbearance is not just within the ambit of the policy, rather it is the policy.250  
By relying on problems that applied to only one part of the policy as sufficient 
to rescind the policy in its entirety,251 Secretary Duke “failed to supply the 
requisite ‘reasoned analysis.’”252  Secretary Nielsen’s memorandum, replete 
with the same flaws, could not make up for Secretary Duke’s deficiency.253  
B. The Court Improperly Dismissed the Reliance Interests at Stake in 
the Rescission. 
While the Court was correct in determining that the rescission of DACA 
was arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA for lack of 
reasoned analysis, it was incorrect in diminishing the reliance interests at 
stake in this case as not significant enough to strike the rescission on their 
own.254  Both agencies and courts are required to consider reliance interests 
in arbitrary and capricious analyses.255  Although the Court went so far as to 
note that failure to address reliance interests “would be arbitrary or 
capricious,”256 the Court also stated that jeopardizing these legitimate 
reliance interests was “not necessarily dispositive” of the rescission’s 
arbitrariness or capriciousness.257  Where agencies and courts fail to consider 
reliance interests—even interests seemingly less significant than the ones at 
stake in the DACA rescission258—not only do the agencies make decisions 
that are arbitrary and capricious within the meaning of the APA, but the 
courts decide cases in problematic and harmful ways.259  
The Supreme Court has considered significant the reliance interests of 
various industries.260  In each case where the Court weighed industry reliance 
                                                          
 248. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1913 (2020). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id.  
 251. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (requiring agencies to consider policies in their entirety 
before making changes to them). 
 252. Id. at 57 (quoting Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. 
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 253. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1916. 
 254. See infra notes 255–300 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra Section II.C.1.a. 
 256. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). 
 257. Regents, 140 S. Ct. at 1914. 
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interests, the Court looked to their pecuniary interests.261  Here, while not 
industry-specific, there are substantial pecuniary interests at stake that the 
Court should have considered: DACA recipients’ own financial interests and 
the financial interests of the country as a whole.262  The pecuniary reliance 
interests at stake in the Court’s prior cases may have been very important, 
but none of them dealt with the individual lives, livelihoods, and liberties263 
of more than 700,000 people.264  DACA recipients made major life decisions 
based on the expected protections of the DACA program, including divulging 
their undocumented status to the government.265 
In NAACP v. Trump,266 the District Court for the District of Columbia 
noted that the more than 700,000 DACA recipients’ reliance interests 
included not only educational interests,267 employment interests,268 and 
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 266. 298 F. Supp. 3d. 209 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 267. Educational interests include earning advanced degrees, participating in postgraduate 
research and studies, and accessing student loans, among others.  Id. at 240 n.24; see also Brief for 
Alianza Americas, supra note 25, at 5. 
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obtain work authorization.  Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 
1902 (2020). 
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financial interests,269 but also personal interests like starting families.270  
Dreamers have invested millions of dollars into the American economy 
through their purchase of assets like homes and cars. 271  More than 43,000 
Dreamers have started their own businesses.272  DACA recipients have also 
invested heavily in education and job training programs with the expectation 
that they would be able to work in the country legally while their removal 
was deferred.273  Losing their DACA status would mean that Dreamers would 
lose access to the investments they have made in themselves because they 
would lose their work authorization, or worse, be deported.274 
While standing alone these interests are significant enough to warrant 
an arbitrary and capricious determination, DACA recipients’ interests are not 
the only ones at stake: employers, schools, families, and communities all 
have interests in DACA’s continued existence.275  Of the more than 700,000 
current Dreamers, ninety three percent are either working or in school.276  
Some 202,500 Dreamers work in jobs classified as “essential” during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, including more than 29,000 frontline healthcare 
workers.277  Around eighty one percent of DACA recipients have graduated 
high school and taken at least one higher education course.278  Thousands of 
DACA recipients are still involved in higher learning, either as educators or 
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 276. Vinopal, supra note 262. 
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researchers.279  Additionally, more than 1.5 million people currently live with 
a DACA recipient, including 254,000 United States citizen children.280   
The government itself would also be harmed if DACA were 
rescinded.281  Not only would the government lose out on billions of dollars 
in taxes each year,282 but it would also see a dip in Social Security and 
Medicare funds.283  Dreamers also contribute more than $42 billion annually 
to America’s gross domestic product.284  The impact of DACA’s rescission 
would “radiate outward” to every aspect of American society.285  With the 
“serious,” life-altering significance of these interests, the Court should have 
found the Dreamers’ reliance interests alone to be “dispositive” of the 
arbitrariness and capriciousness of DHS’s recission, not just “one factor to 
consider.”286  Properly analyzing agency action under the APA means 
analyzing the reliance interests of DACA recipients.287  Given the APA’s 
requirements and the magnitude of the reliance interests at stake in the 
program, it is unlikely the DACA policy could ever be reasonably rescinded 
within the parameters of the APA.288 
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Moreover, the Court appears to contradict itself when discussing 
whether DHS was required to weigh the reliance interests at all.289  The Court 
explicitly notes that “DHS was not required” to weigh the reliance interests, 
then later in the same paragraph states that DHS “was required to assess 
whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were 
significant, and weigh any such interests against competing policy 
concerns.”290  This apparent contradiction in whether DHS was required to 
weigh reliance interests indicates that the Court improperly weighed their 
importance, especially considering the massive impact of recission on DACA 
recipients and the country as a whole.291  Although the Court notes that 
“hardship to DACA recipients” should be considered, the Court ultimately 
rests its decision exclusively on the agency’s failure to provide a reasoned 
analysis.292   
This improper weighing could also be viewed as the Court avoiding its 
responsibility to address the merits of the respondents’ claims.  Here, both 
DHS and the Court were required to at least consider DACA recipients’ 
reliance interests.293  The Court—despite its holdings in Encino 
Motorcars,294 Fox Television Stations,295 and Smiley296—skirted the issue of 
weighing reliance interests altogether by punting the responsibility of 
weighing these interests back to DHS alone.297  In other cases where 
significant reliance interests were at stake,298 the Court addressed these 
concerns, weighed them, and then based on that analysis determined whether 
the agency action was valid.299  By refusing to address the merits of the 
rescissions and focusing only on Secretary Duke’s reasoning, the Court left 
open the possibility for DHS to rescind DACA at a later date despite 
Dreamers’ serious, reasonable reliance on the program.300  Thus, the Court 
did just what it chastised DHS for: failed to address the reliance issues at 
stake.  
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V. CONCLUSION  
In Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of 
California,  the Supreme Court held that DHS’s attempted rescission of 
DACA was arbitrary and capricious in violation of Section 706 of the 
APA.301  The Court correctly determined that the flawed reasoning in the 
Duke and Nielsen memoranda rendered the rescission arbitrary and 
capricious, but incorrectly dismissed Dreamers’ reliance interests.302  Failing 
to articulate adequate reasons for agency action will render agency action 
arbitrary and capricious,303 but so too will failing to address legitimate 
reliance interests.304  In dismissing the many reliance interests at stake in the 
program’s rescission as not “dispositive”305 of arbitrariness or 
capriciousness, the Court incorrectly applied the analysis required by Section 
706 of the APA.306  DHS’s failure to weigh the serious reliance interests of 
both Dreamers and the country as a whole could have alone rendered the 
rescission arbitrary and capricious.307  Hundreds of thousands of Dreamers 
like Abigail built their lives on the promises of DACA and enriched their 
communities in the process.308  The APA mandates that their reliance be 
taken into account.309  
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